As you all should know from the notes you took on last week’s lecture, your Professor spent some time in Atlantic City over the weekend to play some poker with his buddies in lieu of the Omaha 8b tournament at the Borgata. I’ll give you the end of the story before I give you the details; for details, you’ll have to wait a day or three. I’m a busy man.
So, the result: I lost money. That’s about as much as I can give you right now, but I saved some hands and I have an idea for a post dedicated to a moral conundrum of a hand, so I hope to have more content up about the trip this week. In the meanwhile, I wanted to bask in the rush I’ve had online and discuss a couple of hands where I was able to maximize value.
One general concept of poker that I think I learned from former blogger DP at WiredPairs, was that if you would have done the exact same thing as your opponent in a given hand, you’ve really just broken even. This involves an appreciation of the long term view of poker. If you were to play an infinite number of hands, eventually, you will be on the opposite situation of the hand, and if you expect that you will act the same way as your opponent, the two hands will even each other out.
Here is a brief example: You have AA and your opponent has KK. You get into a raising war preflop and you both end up all-in. You double through your opponent. Congrats! But technically, in the long term, this profit will be nil, assuming you are the type of person who never folds KK preflop and likes to get it all-in. Eventually, you’ll be on the opposite side of the AA>KK hand, and you’ll lose all of your profit.
The incremental profit, then, is dependent upon being more skilled than your opponent. In my very simple example, it may mean folding the KK after the third re-raise, assuming you have a read that your opponent has you beat. Hell, even gathering that read may be the skill-difference that earns you money.
Now, this is only relevant in a circumspect way. Because of this Zero-ing Out phenomenon, it makes sense that you must optimize your big hands to earn as much as possible. In limit games, its even more tricky in some ways because you don’t have the benefit of bet sizing to lure in a few more dollars. It is also easier in other ways because your options are a lot more limited.
Back to my online poker rush. For what its worth, last night I took 2nd place in a 2-7 Triple Draw tourney and fourth or third in a PLO/PLHE tournament. I also won a PLO8 HU SNG for $22 and a 6-person NLHE SNG. Plus, I’ve been playing and grinding out small wins at some limit games, mostly LO8, but more recently Badugi and the 8-Game Mix. As a result, my bankroll has gone from $172 or so in the beginning of 2010 to $530 as of today, an increase of over 300%.
This first hand was at a $1/2 Limit 8-Game table. The 8-Games consist of 2-7 Triple Draw, the H.O.R.S.E. games, NLHE and PLO Hi. I had bought in for $40 and was up to $41.25 when this hand occurred. There were only 5 people sitting at the 6-max table.
I was on the button when I was dealt 22 in the Limit Hold’em round. It folded to me, and since we were short handed, I raised from $1 to $2. The SB folded and the BB, Mako, raised. He had over $50.
The raise was odd, but in mixed games, the limit hold’em (and NLHE) round can play a bit different than at a dedicated LHE game. Players seem to be influenced by either the aspects of the other games in play (Ex., there is a latent feeling of, “Oh, this is the easy game” when LHE comes around), or perhaps they are already loosened up from playing LHE on the tail end of the action-packed 2-7TD or the PL or NL games that precede it. It may just be that the mixed game players are less skilled at LHE compared to the players who are dedicated to LHE (I’m looking at you, old people and F-Train).
So, he raises, which would normally make 22 appear weak, but it was just as likely that I was ahead to AK or even KQ or KJs. This was, after all, a shorthanded mixed game. I considered re-raising to $4, but I was assured he would call the extra $1 and I didn’t think I was in good enough position to pump the pot.
The flop was 237 with two clubs, giving me three 2s. Mako was first to act and bet $1. I considered my options. I will often flat call here and wait for the turn when bets are worth $2 before I raise, but I still believed that Mako could have been on two high cards and was continuation betting. In that scenario, I still thought he’d call an extra $1, but I knew that if I waited for the turn and he missed, I’d lose him with a $2 bet. So, I opted to raise immediately. Of course, if he had a good hand (pocket over-pair), he’d likely call the $1 and still bet out on the turn, so that scenario didn’t bother me either. I saw the flush draw out there, but I didn’t want to start seeing monsters under the bed, and it wasn’t like I was going to push him out of the pot if he had the draw. When I raised, he called.
The turn was a 9 of hearts, creating a second flush draw on the 2c 7c 3h 9h board. Naturally, Mako now opts to check, probably because he saw my aggressive re-raise. I bet out $2 and to my surprise, he raised. This gave me a moment’s pause. What made sense here? Draws were still possible, with top-kicker, like A9c. An overpair, though, was more likely, like TT or even AA. So, I re-raised to $6, securing another call, which re-assured me that I was not facing a superior set.
The river was an 8d, which did not help either flush draw. Mako checks again and I bet $2, getting one last call. At showdown, he showed AKh. He had nothing on the flop, but I knew another $1 would keep him around. He picked up the nut flush draw on the turn and I was able to squeeze in another re-raise on his check-raise once I could decipher that his check-raise was likely done with inferior cards. And on the river, I got one last awfuckit call. I don’t think this hand could’ve been better maximized, especially since I was ahead the whole way. On the flipside, I would’ve never gotten as tangled up in the hand with AKh as my opponent did, so the profit was well earned.
The second hand is from an Omaha Hi/Lo game, with blinds of 100/200. I think this was single table turbo SNG with a $16 buy-in. I held 2119 chips, up from the original 1500 starting stack. There were still 7 people left. I was UTG when I was dealt As Qs Qh Td.
I guess I was feeling a tad aggressive, because I raised to 600 (3x the BB) from UTG. AQQT single suited is not a monster hand, but if the board is all high, it is a good scooping hand. I probably raised to push out some of the players who would play a weak low draw for a limp. It folded to the SB, Kookie, who had 2015 in chips. Everyone else folded.
The flop was JJQ, rainbow. I had flopped the second nuts. Only JJ could beat my Queens Full of Jacks. So, it was quite a surprise when my opponent bet out 200, a min bet.
Normally,this would be a tempting time to raise. However, a lot of min-bets are draws or weak hands. In any event, I was near-invincible, so I didn’t mind giving my opponent some rope to hang himself. I just called.
The turn was an 8c, creating a club flush draw. Kookie checked and I considered my best move. Considering his small bet followed by a check, I did not expect him to be strong, but I also wanted to make sure I got some value for my hand. It may be tempting to check here and hope he either makes his lesser hand by the river; however, if he misses the river, you are not going to see another penny from your opponent, so it was time to make a value bet. I bet 400, still tiny compared to the now 1100 pot, and reasonable given my opponent’s stack. He called.
The river was a7d, which appeared useless. Kookie checked again and I decided to bet the same amount, 400. Remember, Kookie started the hand with about 2000, and he had already put 1200 into the pot (600 pre-flop, 200 flop, 400 turn), so he only had 800 left. I reasoned that if he did not have a monster hand, he would be reluctant to call an all-in. But 400 looked weak coming from me and, hopefully, justifiable to him. He called and we reached showdown.
He showed AA28 rainbow, for an unimproved pair of Aces (technically 2-pair with the board’s JJ). I took down the pot and almost doubled through Kookie.
If there is a lesson to learn about these hands, its that you must really take your time when making decisions about maximizing your hands. The typical responses may not be the best one, especially when you consider what your opponent may have and what cards may kill or bring additional action.
Later this week, I’ll recap AC, write about the Aces Conundrum and hopefully continue my online streak.
Until next time, make mine poker!
