High On Poker

I wrote a long post about a week ago regarding working out chops in live tournaments (I don’t believe in online chops), but I referred to a Mookie post which is now old, so I’d rather start fresh and see if I can come up with a more rounded piece. Such is the life of Jordan, lately. I’m up to my ears in work, stressed out to the max, on poker withdrawal, and yet, I insist on writing posts that ulitmately never see the light of day. Man, I need a vacation.

But before I get any vacation, let’s talk about the wonderful world of chops. In fact, let’s do a list, since its as easy a way to explain my random thoughts as any. So here are

Jordan’s Do’s and Don’ts of Chopping

Some people never chop. Good for them. But realistically, there are many reasons why chopping makes sense, so knowing how to get the most out of a chop is a good skill to have. With this in mind, consider the following tips:

DO speak your mind. If you don’t like a deal, it doesn’t matter what anyone else at the table or the room thinks. If you are getting pressure to make a deal, just remember that you entered the game with YOUR money, and the object of the game is to win the money of other people. That’s it, plain and simple. The guy pressuring you didn’t pay your buy-in, and the object of the game is not to make friends or be a good sport. Stand by your ground and reject any bad offers without fear of consequence. In fact, feel free to remind these jags that you are playing for money, your money, and you’ll do whatever you damn well please.

DO know the reason for chopping. In live tournament situations, there are generally a very few number of reasons why people want to chop. You need to identify your reason, but more importantly, you need to identify your opponents’ reason(s). Generally, the reasons are either (i) uncertainty about the results of poker, (ii) time constraints, (iii) outside pressures to end the game early, and (iv) boredom. The only reason why YOU should be chopping is (i) the uncertainty of poker. Hopefully, you’ve planned to win the entire time, so you don’t have any time constraints. Sometimes in homegames, other players are waiting for the next tourney or cash game, OR in other venues, your partners in crime want to leave and have to wait for you. In either instance, you’ve got to be willing to tell those people to fuck off. A nicer way is to say, “I’ll bust this guy in a minute and we can get out of here.” But whatever you do, don’t let outside pressure overinfluence your decision-making skills. If your problem is boredom, then just you shouldn’t have played in the first place.

As you can see, I’m pretty hard on reasons (ii) through (iv), mostly because I think you have to always play to win. Some people never chop. For those people, (i) is not a bother. That may be you, in which case, you are wasting your time reading this. But for the rest of us, the promise of definite money can be a strong temptation, and as long as you are able to make a smart deal, I think it is perfectly acceptable.

So, once you’ve identified your reason, you need to know their reason. Why? Because like anything in poker, that information gives your more power. Fortunately, unlike most aspects of poker, your opponents are probably not hiding their reasons. You know that there are other people waiting for your opponent, or your opponent says, “Let’s just chop. I need to get home.” Good. Now you know you have an edge. It might not get the chipleader to give you more money, but you could use it to gain a few more bucks.

You can exploit your opponent by working out various angles based on their reason for wanting the chop. If its uncertainty, reinforce their thoughts and fears by sounding confident: “We don’t have to chop. I’ll gladly play it out.”

If its time constraints or pressure placed on your opponent by other people, try to sound like you are being helpful by working out a deal: “Look, I know its getting late, so let’s just work it out.” By sounding reasonable, your opponent will likely let down his guard and will think that you are compromising more than you actually are. If you need ato add a bit more pressure, you can always fall back to, “I guess we can’t work this out. Okay, I’m ready to play. Let’s get back to this.”

If your opponent is bored, then just make the deal quick. He’ll be so anxious to enter the juicy cash game or do whatever the hell he wants to do that he’ll generally just agree to anything that sounds near reasonable.

DO know the stack sizes and total amount of chips in play. Generally, in a tournament you know how many players entered or how many buy-ins there were by the end table. So, if there are 40 players with 2500 starting stacks, you should be able to figure out that there is 100,000 chips in play. Once you know that, check your stack. This way, when you get HU, you know that you have 43k and he has 57k.

Why do you need that info ready to go? So you can say, “Look, we are about even. There is 100k in play and I have just short of 50,” after the other guy suggests a chop. By knowing this info, you can frame the situation as an almost-even affair, instead of a 2:3 situation. Here’s another reason from experience: At the recent IHO tournament, when we got to HU, I thought CK had me outchipped. After a count, it was discovered that I had the lead. Suddenly the situation changed a whole lot. Before counting, I was trying to figure out how to get an even chop with my shorter stack. Afterwards, I was looking for a more equitable chop. And you’ll be amazed at how many people neglect to count their stack and simply go by eyeballing the stack once talks of chopping start.

If you can, discretely work out this math or bust out the ole calculator (you probably have one on your phone) to figure out what an equitable chop would be. Now, round that number up for you, and make that your proposal or your bottom-line (depending on how bloodthirsty you are).

DO know the prize pool and the prizes for all spots still in play. Once you have that information, you can come up with a sliding scale of solutions.

This is really the core of my chopping technique. If first place gets $400 and 2nd gets $200, I like to look at the range of convenient possibilities. The range always goes from even chop ($300/$300) to no deal ($400/200). As you can see, $600 looks like there is a lot of wiggle room, but the reality is that there is very little room for improvisation at all. I’ll often voice these ideas aloud once I’ve done the math internally: “I have you outchipped, so I’m not giving you even money. How about $360/$240? You get an extra $40 easily.” If he argues, I’ll explain, “I can’t go any higher. I mean, the next step is $340/$260, and that isn’t fair. Hell, let’s just play it out.” Sometimes, you can follow this up with a trick I learned from mediation. “Okay, let’s just split the baby. After all, we are only arguing over $20 now. $350/$250.” Splitting the baby always seems good, especially when YOU made the baby into a $20 range, instead of discussing the broad $200-400 range.

In smaller games, (single table tournaments), the range can be tiny. In some $20 tournaments I’ve played, 1st gets $120 and 2nd gets $80. The only reasonable chops, therefore, are $100/100 and $90/$110. If that’s the case, then at least you know what you are working with and you can get right down to business.

DO have a justification for your proposals. “How about I get $280 and you get $320,” sounds like a crappy proposal to a guy with a 2:1 advantage. “Let’s chop $280/320. There isn’t much leeway in the prize pool. Anyway, we both have less than 20x the BB, so we are both really short and if I double up, suddenly I’m the huge chipleader. It’s a freaking crapshoot,” is a lot more convincing. Even simple things like, “I bought in for X and I want to make X for this to be worthwhile” will get your opponent to consider your viewpoint.

DON’T take too much time working out a chop. If its taken longer than 5 minutes, just tell the other player that you’d rather just play it out if its going to be a big thing. If he/she really wants to chop, this is when they’ll break and begin offering a better deal for you that a moment ago was not on the table. Or, its when they’ll suddenly consider the offer you made 4 minutes ago that they insisted was unfair. After a couple of hands, if you have an edge, feel free to say that the “offer is still on the table for now” (as long as the deal is still acceptable and good to you). If you’ve taken a bigger lead since the last offer, you can even add a, “Now I can’t make that deal with my chip stack.” Whatever you do, though, don’t stop the action until he agrees to a chop.

The key here is to show that you aren’t desperate to chop. If you can’t settle in 5 minutes, it isn’t going to happen without you making a big concession. Some opponents are stubborn and others don’t like chopping. In either event, you don’t want to show too much of a desire to chop, so returning to the action while dropping hints that a chop is still possible (while action commences) will allow you to keep your position of strength AND leave the door open to a chop.

DON’T ask for a chop, unless you are heads up. I’m not a fan of asking for the chop. As soon as you do, the other players have the power to say no, and an astute player will use your desire to chop as leverage. They may even see it as an opportunity to run over you, once they reject the chop and get back to the action. Instead, let them come to you. At that point, you can tell them that you are open to the idea if it is a good deal. Then, ask them to give you an offer. At least you’ll have an idea of what they are thinking.

I added one exception. As soon as you are heads up, you may want to bring up a chop. This is my one exception because it does not look desperate. By the time most players are heads up, they have already entertained the idea of a chop, so, if you are HU and have near even chips (2:1 at most), you can go ahead and bring up the subject of chopping before HU play begins. Once HU play begins, though, I would advise not to bring it up again unless you are even in chips and want to chop even.

The emphasis on HU chops is due in large part to the tediousness of live HU poker. With the shuffling and the constant preflop folds, it can be a slow game. Online is MUCH quicker, which is why I do not like online chops. You may as well play it out. But live, if the stack sizes are near equal and the prize pool is sufficient, a chop is much easier to work out when facing the prospect of a long HU match after a long tournament.

DON’T make any “save deals” unless you are in last place. This one drives me nuts. I’ll be sitting on a big stack and some guy will say, “Let’s work out a save for 4th place.” Great, numb nuts, but why the hell would I make a deal to save someone else? When you are making a deal, you are making a deal for one person and one person only: YOU. If you are not going to go out on the bubble, then don’t make this deal. I would think that this is common sense, but at almost every game I’ve play at Salami, someone suggests a save at the end. Usually, I’m in a good chip position and I’ll tell the guys straight out, “Why would I give someone else a save out of my prize money.” Not only does this lay out my position, but it shows that I expect to cash high. Exuding confidence is always a nice touch.

So, do you have any tips you’d like to add?

Until next time, make mine poker!

Quick Tip:

When playing poker, if you know that you are beat, fold.

That’s today’s quick tip!

I entered a betting pool with my brother in law Marc. Its an interesting pool. For $100, you are entered into a pick’em league, a survivor pool (choose one team each week, if they win, you survive to the next week; if you pick a losing team twice, you are eliminated; you cannot choose the same team twice in a season), a margin pool (same as survivor, but you keep track of the amount of points you win by and the highest total wins), and a few other random pools. I pushed for Jacksonville as our survivor/margin pick. At the time, the spread was the same as the New England spread, and I wanted to keep NE in our back pocket for later in the season. Well, JAX lost, so fuck that. Oh well. No one will ever get me confused with a sports bettor.

I am a better lawyer than I am a sports bettor, so I guess I have that going for me. This morning I had to go to Court where a Judge had already threatened sanctions against me for making simple discovery motions. This time, the Judge threatened sanctions again, and even included a price tag, $1500, but I stood my ground. I won, too. The Defendants had to give me everything I wanted AND if they don’t comply, they’ll be paying sanctions. Score one for the good guys.

We hired a new associate a month or two ago. He’s a good guy, and actually reminds me of myself when I was first learning the ropes. He had to cover another motion for me this morning. I spent Friday walking him through the process since he was out of the office on Monday. I went through everything with painstaking detail, since I know how much it sucks to be at Court and have no idea what’s going on with the Court system or the case. He came back today with the best case scenario, an order giving us everything we want AND also sets a date for us to come back in case the Defendants don’t comply. Make no doubt about it, if there was a reason why law suits take so long, its the Defendants. A Plaintiff has to build sandcastles, but all a Defendant has to do is sit on their ass, and then stroll by later and kick it over. Its the way the system is and its not a reflection on the individuals who practice insurance defense, although, like most areas of law, they have more than their fair share of assholes.

Granted, none of this is poker, but I haven’t been playing much. Last night, wifey Kim and I watched two episodes of Heroes (she was ready for #3, but it was getting late and I didn’t want her passing out in the middle of “Four Months Ago.” I’ve never been a fan of reruns of serialized shows, but Heroes has once again amazed me. In each episode I see a variety of things I either forgot or didn’t notice. The hardest part is fielding wifey Kim’s questions. “Is he a Hero?” “What are they talking about?” and so on. I don’t want to ruin anything for her, but I also want to help her along, since the show can be a bit twisted and convoluted with all of the different storylines.

After we watched the shows, I signed up for the Hoy tournament. I went out 14th out of 25. I started off playing well, but in the end, my play dissolved as I got tired and less interested. Online poker just hasn’t held my interest lately, but that’s all fine and good. Lord knows its only a matter of time before I’m back to playing online poker nightly. In fact, I lost the Hoy shortly after wifey Kim went to bed. On one hand, when she left I felt relieved that I could focus. On the other, I actually (warning! sappy, ghey comment pending) missed her, even though we spent all night together and she was in the next room. Jordan loves Wifey Kim.

While I’m rambling, I’m sure we’ve all saw or heard about the debacle that was Britney Spears’ performance at the Video Music Awards. I watch an assload of television, so I’d like to add my 2 cents on the VMAs in general. Britney Spears was the perfect openning act, because she really set the tone for the show. Unfortunately for the VMAs, the tone was set as “mess.” There is little sadder than watching the spank material of a generation turn from underage hottie to barely of-age piggy slob. She is clearly suffering from the same problems suffered by Michael Jackson, Tom Cruise and a bazillion other celebrities before her. No one is telling her no. When you get rich and famous, most of the people around you are ass-kissing sycophants, who want to bask in the run-off of your limelight. These people are not going to tell you that you look like a pig, or that you should not go out drinking, snorting and fucking while your babies are at home with the nanny 5 days a week. Nope. Those fuckers will tell you, “Oh Britney, the orange Cheetos dust around your mouth looks so sexy!” and “That bra and panties outfit looks so hot! Of course you should wear it on stage in front of millions of people!” What trash!

But as bad as she was, the VMAs were generally a train wreck. Clearly, the production was filled with flubs, from people waiting around for their cues, to half-interested presenters who could barely read the teleprompters. It was like watching a kindergarten production. I half expected presenters to come out in paper mache turkey costumes and pilgrim hats.

Oddly, the highlight of the night came from the man who first deflowered that sweaty hog named Britney. Justin Timberlake, he of the Timbaland Tribe, challenged MTV to play more videos. True dat, JT! I mean, how can you have an award show for something that isn’t even shown publicly anymore. And don’t give me that MTV2 crap. MTV needs to play videos. Their failure to do so has actually hurt the artists, who now cannot get budgets for videos. Whatever. Fucking MTV.

Where the hell dd this post go. Nothing to do now but hit post and get the fuck out. Thanks for reading.

Until next time, make mine poker!

My my. I must admit that I am definitely a bit results-oriented, even though I do not lament results when they suffer from bad luck. But since I was a young kid, exterior signs of success were very important to me. As a young artist (who has since developed into a dormant art tinkerer), I did not understand the point of my art unless someone aside from myself could verify the artyness. At school, nothing made me happier than receiving a grade, mostly because I was able to skate through school (including law school) with minimal studying and great (later turning to good) results.

It is with that same need for an exterior validation that I was ecstatic to win the I Had Outs September to Remember tournament (September to Remember being a name that I have added to the otherwise simply named I Had Outs September tournament).

I had made my way over to Dawn’s apartment via a couple of subways and arrived a scant 10 minutes before the scheduled 8pm start time. I decided to grab a chicken roll from the nearby pizza place and stumbled upon the ubiquitous CK and her friend Jesse as they headed to the elevators. On the way up, we made light conversation, as I played down my recent $400 Wall Street Game loss. Upstairs, we entered Dawn’s apartment to see Fisch and two or three other guys watching the latest WSOP on ESPN. I grabbed a spot and had some dinner as we waited for the other players to arrive.

As with 99% of home games, most players arrive 30+ minutes late. I killed time by heavy-lifting and manual labor under the supervision of foreman Dawn. I also made a mental note to arrive at 9pm next time. Man, I’m such a sucker for manual labor.

Surprisingly, right before kick-off, a slew of players entered the apartment. By then CK had already set up the chips, and the players were already circling for seats. There were to be three partially-filled tables in total, the Smoker’s Table on the balconey, the Main Table, and the Kid’s Table, named affectionately after the cheesy folding table with mismatched chairs that always got the worst piece of the challah (Jewish holidays) or turkey (for you non-Jews) at family holiday dinners. The Kid’s Table was actually a good-quality folding poker table set up in the living room. Its largest shortcoming is the seats, most of which are couches that are slightly too low for comfortable poker. That said, in New York City (including the outter boroughs like Dawn’s Brooklyn apartment…yuck, outter boroughs), space and chairs are always limited, and the Kid’s Table was the perfect solution to space and seating woes.

By the time I pulled my seat card (Ten of clubs), the Kid’s Table was already mostly full. There were a decent amount of players at the Tournament that I didn’t know well, but they didn’t sit at the Kid’s Table. I basically took the 1s, an actual chair (score!), as no one pulled the black Ace during seat drawings. To my left was 2-7 Triple Alceste, “the Human Stick Figure” F-Train, Kearns of KJ-Technique (at least I think that’s who he was, as I didn’t get introduced formally), Mary of Bacon-kini fame, Degenerate Impressario CK, and mild-mannered Jesse. If you are keeping score, that was 8 people, including me. There was an ninth player, Gus, but he chose to move to the Smoker’s Table once we realized that the amount of players per table were lopsided.

For a split second, I volunteered to move first. The Smokers are a fun group, and the breeze and air was cool outside. I also didn’t much feel like playing against the same people I see almost weekly at a slew of home games. On the other hand, I had played with the Smokers before, and my game suffered as a result. In my experience, the group can be very aggressive, which actually mirrors my own style in some ways. This can cause some high variance play, something that is terrible for tournaments. It can also cause me to tighten up, which I tried last time, but I felt more confident with the devils I knew, and let Gus take the outdoor spot.

Within two hands, I was glad for my decision. In the second hand, I was dealt 89s in EP. The blinds were 25/50 with 3k starting stacks. Jesse, UTG (I think) raised to 150. I called. The rest of the table folded around to the BB, CK, who called as well. If this is wrong, the only adjustment was that CK was the SB, Jesse was the BB, I limped UTG and then after CK called, Jesse raised 3x the BB, getting calls from CK and me. Regardles, the flop was J88 and CK checked. Jesse checked. I bet out 400 or so. Jesse called. The turn was a blank. Jesse checked and I raised 1200 or something similar into the pot. He raised and I called. The river was a blank and Jesse pushed all-in. I thought for a bit before calling. He asked, “Do you have the eight?” I figured he was about to ask about my kicker, but after I said yes and tabled my 89s, he showed KK. REBUY! I had already doubled up.

From there, the game was fairly relaxed for me. I played a decent amount of pots for cheap. I didn’t have any amazing starting hands, but I didn’t need them either. F-Train was working hard collecting chips, giving them back, and collecting them again. In fact, I noticed that F-Train and I were mirroring our Okie-Vegas tourney, except that our roles were reversed. We were even in reverse seat position, with me two to his right rather than the opposite. Not too surprisingly, we didn’t get into many hands against each other, mostly because I know better. F-Train is not to be fucked with.

I also saved myself from a prop bet from hell. I can be a bit snarky. For those of you who haven’t seen the term much, Dictionary.com defines it as “Rudely sarcastic or disrespectful.” I wouldn’t go so far as to say I’m disrespectful, because it is all tongue-in-cheek snarkiness, but sometimes I catch myself overdoing it. Whatever the case, CK asked me why I was so “snarky” (mocking my own words…), and I promised not to make a snarky comment the rest of the night. Talks of a prop bet started, but I had already mentally made about 13 snarky comments within that 2 minute time frame, so I knew I would be bound to lose. We made it a gentlemen’s bet, i.e., no money was involved, which is ironic because CK and I are degenerates who would bet on most anything and neither of us should be classified as “gentlemen.” I think I broke my snark-silence about 15 minutes later, when I made some comment about the Main Table being a bunch of folding losers. Shame on me.

I don’t remember many other memorable hands. Right before the first break, I was dealt TT in the BB. F-Train led out with a bet and was raised by Kearns. By the time it got to me, I reluctantly folded. After F-Train folded, I showed my cards and Kearns showed JJ. In reality, laying down TT out of position facing a raise and re-raise was not too difficult, but I was glad that my decision was validated. I had another interesting hand with Kearns a little later (or was it before?). I had AKc in MP or maybe LP with Kearns in a blind. I raised it up, I think F-Train may’ve called, and Kearns pushed all-in. My raise was something like 1200, with blinds of 200/400. I thought for a long while, but I couldn’t get a read off of Kearns. I thought he looked confident overall, but I made the crying call, since I had him so outstacked. The call was 3000 or 4000 more, and if I lost, I’d still be the table chipleader or thereabouts. He was playing well, so it’d be nice to bust him too. He showed AKd. By the turn, he had a flush draw, but the river missed him and we chopped it up. He told me it was a nice call, and I told him it was a great raise. I’m still not sure about my call, but the results were good enough.

I never rebought and by the end of the 2-hour rebuy period, I had busted Jesse again and had a stack of 14.5k. We all took a break and I chatted out on the balconey with some of the players. LJ was playing at the Main Table, and we made small talk outside.

She asked, “Are you the chipleader at your table?”
I responded, “Yep. Doing alright. How is it going for you?”
“Okay.” I sensed she was not entirely pleased by the tone of her voice.
“Well, did you rebuy?”
“No.”
“Do you have more chips than your starting stack? I mean, you must, otherwise you’d be short.” I was trying to encourage her. After all, I like LJ, as I do most of the blogging community and NY bloggers in particular.
“I have about 19k.”
“19k?” I was shocked. I was definitely chip leader at my table, but LJ’s stack blew me away. When I last saw LJ’s stack a while ago, she was nowhere near 19k. That, and she played it off like she was, well, just doing, “Okay”.
“Damn,” I continued, “looks like you got the chiplead.” I was rightly impressed. Even though the game is played at the Crackhouse, the competition is a lot tougher than one might think.

After a while, the Smoker’s Table broke up and three players took the three seats to my immediate right. I had effectively moved to the 1s, and Elena had the 10s. We chatted for a bit. She was upset about her shortstack and position relative to the uber-aggro Jordan, but she put on a clinic and chipped up steadily over the next few orbits. Granted, she didn’t get near my stack, but my stack did have a prohibitive lead and according to Elena, the Smoker’s Table was actually quite tame without a lot of rebuys.

After some time, we got to the final table. LJ still had the chiplead, with me nipping at her heels. In the first hand, I tangled with Ron, Karol’s brother, and took his stack in a donktastic manner. Ron raised to 1000 or maybe 1400 with blinds of 200/400. I was in the BB with 78o. I eyed his stack and saw that he had 4k behind. I called, hoping to flop something and stack him. I also thought that Ron was loose aggressive, so I thought I could get all of his chips if I flopped a pair. The flop was J8x, and I checked. Ron insta-pushed, I called, and he showed KJ for top pair. My preflop read was correct, but he hit his pair also. The turn was a 7, and he was knocked out.

I don’t remember much else for a while. I was mostly card dead, and folded away. Eventually, we were down to 6, with me, LJ, CK, Shy, Gus, and Kearns. I think Kearns went out next and Gus shortly after. Shy busted in fourth, and it was me, LJ and CK. I was still in second behind LJ at this point, and I was hoping we could get rid of CK and work out a chop. CK, however, had other ideas in mind, and slowly added to her stack. For the most part, I played conservatively.

By then, the blinds were up to 300/600 or maybe 400/800, and since there were only three of us, most hands were taken down preflop with a 3x bet (2400). With this in mind, I was delighted to see KK on the button, and opted to min-bet to get some action. I raised to 1600 (let’s assume 400/800 blinds), and LJ, in the SB, announced a raise, 4000 more. I hemmed and hawed, trying to look like I was agonizing over the decision. The thought crossed my mind that LJ might have AA. After all, she exuded a lot of confidence when she re-raised. However, we were three-handed, and I am known for being full of shit, so I decided to put my fear of Bullets behind me. I raised 10k on top.

These were some big numbers. Realistically, we probably both had around 30 to 40k. I wanted to push all-in, but I thought it looked too eager. 10k on top was a nice round number, and to my delight, LJ took the opportunity to push all-in. I called instantly. She showed 44 and my KK held up. She didn’t realize how deep my stack was, so by the time I was paid off, she looked like she was in desperate shape.

Like CK, LJ was not going to give up easily and battled back to a respectable stack. In fact, over time, I started bleeding chips because I didn’t want to double up either of these femme sharks, and I wasn’t getting cards worth dick. I raised with A7o once, but CK re-raised and I had to let it go. I was not looking to pay off anyone.

Finally, CK raised in a hand, I called with some random cards (I really have no idea now), and LJ called. The flop was Q-high, rainbow, and it checked around. On the turn, another spade, I checked and one of the girls bet. I folded. By the river, a third spade fell and LJ ended up all-in (CK barely had her covered). CK had rivered the flush and LJ lost with her flopped top-pair. LJ was a bit upset at her play, and I know how she feels. I had made the same 44 vs. KK move at the Wall Street Game not too long ago (in that instance, I rivered a 4 for a suckout) and have repeatedly caught myself making bad calls late in games. It can be very disheartening. Still, I didn’t fault her too bad for slowplaying top-pair. It was hard to get any action between the three of us, so it made sense for her to try to milk some action, as long as she was cautious. I guarantee that she gets away from the hand if an Ace falls, but how could she expect that the preflop raise from CK meant T8s, for runner runner flush.

After LJ busted, CK and I counted our chips. To my amazement, I was still in the lead with about 56k to her 46k. We busted out the ole calculator and did an equitable chop, netting me $370 in profit.

After the game, CK, LJ and I shared a car service into NYC. The girls were dropped off first at a new underground poker room. A+ in Degeneracy, girls! I, on the other hand, returned home, where my wife was sleeping in bed. I sat in the living room for a bit, unwinding and flipping around the channels looking for anything to numb my mind before bed. The poker adrenaline was still pumping hard, but TV was a wasteland, so I joined wifey Kim in bed with my iPod to keep me company as I attempted to doze.

Thanks to Dawn and Karol for hosting the game. I needed that win to get me over the $1000 in losses at Nice Look and the Wall Street Game. Not too long ago, Dawn wrote about the $400 loss and said this: “I’ve very rarely seen Jordan lose money when playing live poker…” That means a lot, especially since I think its fairly true. I may be a lot of things at the poker table. I’m sociable, I’m snarky, I’m often wacky and unpredictable, but I’m also winning. Too bad there is no money in being a home game, low buy-in tournament specialist. But its nice for building the ‘roll.

I don’t see much poker on the near horizon. This is a busy week with the Jewish holidays on Wednesday night through Friday night, and the Lord don’t take kindly to gamblin’ (I should know; the Lord and me are tight). Luckily, the Lord has nothing against online poker.

I’ll be heading to AC in October. My main man Dave Roose was there a few weeks ago with his new wife. He called me from AC longing for a guys’ trip. It has been way to long, so we are booked for mid-October. Other than that, we go back again for a Very Degenerate X-Mas. Otherwise, its all homegames.

Until next time, make mine poker!

I have to admit, I did not get the amount of comments I was hoping for, but such is a blog, so I’ll do what I can with what I have. Principally, the more I think about bet sizing, the more I’ve come to the conclusion that round numbers tend to tempt players into calling, and odd numbers (odd tend to elicit folds. While those two conclusions seem to be exact opposites, the interplay between the two is a bit more complicated, and seem to turn on whether play is online or live, tournament or cash.

Looking at the pop quiz, we start with what I consider my worst-crafted question: Playing an online poker tournament, with a pot of 120, BB vs. SB, if the flop is Ace-high, what is the best bet to elicit a fold – 80, 100, 120 or 140? Why is this the worst crafted? Because unlike the other questions, the focus seems to be more on whether a fold-inducing bet should be bigger or smaller than the pot. The comments, however, seem to lean mostly toward 100, and I’m inclined to agree. Hoyazo said 120 or 100, CK said 80 or 100, and Surflexus said 100. So why is it that 100, a “round” number if ever there was one, is actually an odd number in this scenario. The answer is the pot size. With a 120 pot, a 120 or 80 bet makes sense. Its something that can be readily quantified by an average player. 100, on the other hand, does not lend itself to a thoughtless pot odds analysis, and I guarantee you that most pot odd analysis is done subconsciously. As poker players and, for the most part, intelligent people, we understand how bets interact with pot sizes without affirmatively processing the math. We know the “feel” of an 80 or 120 bet into a 120 pot, and so we know how to act accordingly. But a 100 bet, well, that’s just peculiar. So, our brains subconsciously tell us that something is wrong and we fold. Or so my theory goes.

The second question addresses the flip side: what bet sizes induce a call? The specific question is, if you flop trips and your opponent leads out with a 500 bet, how much would you bet if you are trying to induce a call – 500 more, 750 more, 1000 more, or 1500 more. Once again, the question suffers for the sheer breadth of the subject. The majority of the comments, however, chose 1000 more, for reasons that are similar but slightly different than the reasoning I am about to set forth. But first, lets examine the other choices. Surflexus liked the 1500 raise, but because it might look like a bluff because its such a large raise. In my opinion, the bet is too high and would push out all but the strongest opposing hands. Also, the 1500 bet is an intimidating one. You’ve broken the magical number of 1000 or even 1200, numbers that to me just look a lot more “round” and therefore comfortable. In fact, I beseech you to leave a comment, because maybe this is all just me. So I ask, just looking at the digits, doesn’t 1500 look MUCH more intimidating than 1200, even though there is only a mere 300 difference? For the same reason, the 750 raise was ignored by all commentors. That 750 number is just too awkward, and your opponent is going to see that number and think that something is fishy. CK and Hoyazo thought the 1000 raise was better to induce a call because it was a standard 3x raise that would not raise suspicion, and I wholeheartedly agree. I add, also, that psychologically, the number 1000 is so round and, for lack of a better word, comforting, that it would be easy to call 1000 with a number of dominated hands.

The third question begins to delve into the idea of bet-sizing in live cash games. I believe there is a different psychology at work here, likely because you do not get to see “CALL 1000″ written out on your monitor. Instead, you have to react to the bets called out, so the comfort of all those zeros (and I sincerely believe that there is a comfort to 1000 because it is so round and familiar) is nil. So, with that in mind, the question turns to how you can control people’s actions through bet sizing live. In my estimation, the most effective use of bet sizing live is when you are trying to force a fold. In fact, I have started a bunch of hands with the sole intention of taking down a pot with weird-sized bets, and it almost always works.

In the third question, I asked, would you call or fold from the BB with AJs and a flop of A23, if the bettor preflop bet $13, got three callers (including you), and then (after you check) the bettor bets out $33 into the $52 pot. Hoyazo folds in a heartbeat, CK hates AJ so lets assume she’ll fold, Surf check-raises for info, and msbuss folds but questions whether a check-raise is in order. I’m inclined to agree with Surf and msbuss’ question regarding a check-raise, but realistically, I’m likely folding after a lot of hemming and hawing. Why? Those are some wacky-ass bets, and I don’t know what the hell they mean. $13 preflop? Why not $12 or $15, both of which are more common in most 1/2 NL games? $33 post flop? Where the hell did that number come from? How about a pot-sized bet or even $25 or $30? The key is, those weird bets can be very disorientating. I know, because they often work like a charm. Players will often call the preflop bet thinking that the weird bet is full of crap and then fold to another weird bet on the flop because they realize that their initial thought on the preflop raise do not comport with the post-flop bet; this all in addition to the fact that the numbers are too awkward to analyze with any confidence. I commend Surf on his check-raise response, but I also have to wonder how big you check-raise to get the right info. You could just bet 3x his bet, or $99, or round that up to $100, but at 1/2 NL, a $100 bet is often 1/3 of your stack or more. That’s some expensive information.

In the final question, I asked what you do if you call a raise to a mere $7 out of position with pocket 6s, check the KJ5 flop, and then face a $13 bet from the original raiser. Hoy folds, CK thinks its a fold/raise situation, and Surf folds most of the time. I’m inclined to fold here, since, like Hoy, I’m hoping to flop the set out of position. But the question remains, do those weird sized bets induce the call preflop (“It’s only $5″) and a fold post-flop (“It’s only $13, but WTF does he have that he’d bet $13?!?”). In my estimation, its hard to place your opponent on a hand. He could just as easily have ATs or 89s and just bet his position postflop after his preflop pot-builder with his drawing hand. But, likewise, he could have KJ or AJ or AK or KQ or 77 or any number of hands that have you dominated. Compare this with a $12 or $15 raise preflop and a pot-sized bet post-flop, which can be easily analyzed as a strong hand, OR a $8 raise preflop and a pot-sized bet post-flop, which can be easily analyzed as a pot-builder/missed-flop-bluff. This question continued with a turn bet of $19 and a river of $27, two numbers that are not as high as they should be, traditionally, if you are trying to push a player out of a pot. Even so, I would argue that while they are smaller bets, they are as effective, if not moreso, than larger bets to push opponents out of pots. They also have the added benefit of saving you some money when your opponent has flopped a monster and is slowplaying (expect him to raise on the river, at which point, you know the jig is up and you can fold for cheaper than pot-sized bets the whole way).

Kaja asked one final question that I would like to address: “I have recently read and seen some big MTT players make x99 bets. Raise to 299, re-raise to 1599, etc. I think those are so confusing. How does that play into your psycho analysis?” Good question, Kaja, because it touches upon something I neglected to include in my original questions. We are all used to advertisements and price tags touting the $X.99 price. In fact, gas stations even list gasoline at a price that usually ends in 9/10th of a cent. They do this because the $4.99 looks a lot nicer and cheaper than $5. If you were just to take that knowledge, you would assume that these MTT players are trying to encourage calls by making their bets look smaller than they actually are. But I would argue the opposite.

We all are well aware of the 99 phenomenon, so when you see a bet of 899 instead of 900, arguably you are going to be MORE suspicious of the bet, and consequently, you are going to be more likely to fold. That 99 is a signal, subconsciously or otherwise, that your opponent is trying to “sell you” on their bet, and get you to buy. More generally, I was thinking about bets that are just under pot. When the pot is 1200, a bet of 1100 is a lot more scary than a pot-sized 1200 bet, because of the things we discussed earlier: (a) the subconscious pot odd calculations are thrown off, (b) the bet size is awkward and uncomfortable and (c) these two things get you to question the reason for the raise and in most instances people conclude that they bet below pot to try to induce a call — similar to the $4.99 price.

If you have any thoughts on the subject, let me know, because these are all theories that I am still hammering out, and there is just too much community knowledge out there to be tapped. I thank the commentors for their input, as the three largest comments came from three of the most intelligent poker-thinkers I know, all of which have distinctly different styles and all of which are extremely successful. Thanks, guys.

And while I’m here, I might as well share, I won the I Had Outs tournament last night, with CK coming in 2nd (we actually did an equitable chop, heads up) and LJ taking third. I’m sure I’ll be writing it up soon enough, but…

Until then, make mine poker!

Busy busy busy.

I called my grandma last night to wish her a happy birthday. Like all of our longer conversations, we eventually got to talking about poker. She and my other deceased grandma taught me cards at a young age. While my deceased grandma wasn’t much of a gambler, the birthday grandma sure is. Even today, she and my grandpa love to go to the local penny casino in Florida to win gift cards (which, incidentally, often get mailed up to NY).

While talking about poker, I mentioned my recent downswing, mostly from the $600 loss at Nice Look (permanently closed, according to rumors) and $400 loss at the Wall Street Game. Her response, “You should take a break.” I’m already on it, grandma.

That may be why I have been so quiet here this week. Well, that and the pile of work I’ve been steadily attacking with all my might. But whatever the case, I’m playing tomorrow night at the I Had Outs September to Remember tournament (name made up by me), so my hiatus will be (as usual) short-lived.

While I’m not playing poker, I’m still thinking about it. Lately, I’ve been thinking about the psychology of numbers and bet sizing. I believe that changing the size of your bet by miniscule amounts could make the difference between getting a call or fold. Still, most of the time, these decisions on bet sizing are based on “hunches” which are more likely subtle subconscious decisions made based on what I’ve seen. What I would like to do now is test some ideas and see the results. I’m definitely going to need your help with this, so the more responses, the better.

You are playing online poker in an MTT. The blinds are 30/60 and everyone at your table is near their starting stacks. It folds to you in the SB and you call. The BB checks. The flop has an Ace. The pot is 120. How much do you bet if you want to induce a fold? Why?

(a) 80
(b) 100
(c) 120
(d) 140

You are in an online tournament and are dealt 89s in MP, with blinds of 50/100. You limp, along with one player before you and one player after you, and the two blinds come along for the ride (5 to the flop). The flop is K88. The pot is 500. The limper in EP bets 500. You want to raise and induce a call from the original bettor. How much do you raise and why?

(a) 1000 (500 more)
(b) 1250 (750 more)
(c) 1500 (1000 more)
(d) 2000 (1500 more)

You are playing live poker at a full cash game (1/2 NL). You are dealt AJs in the BB. Preflop, a player in MP raises to $13 and gets three callers including the SB. You call as well ($52 pot). The flop is A23 with no flush draws. You check and the preflop raiser bets $33. It folds around to you. Do you call or fold? Why?

Final question (3-parter): You are playing live poker at a full cash game (1/2 NL). You are dealt 66 in the SB. A loose player from MP raises to $7 (usual raises at this table preflop are $12). You call. The flop is KJ5. You check. He bets $13. Do you call, fold or raise? Assuming you called, the turn is another Jack. You check and he bets $19. Do you call, fold or raise? Assuming you called, the river is a 4. You check. He bets $27. Do you call, fold or raise?

Hopefully, this will all work out. Originally, I was going to give you some general thoughts, but I’m curious to see what people have to say about these scenarios. I know that I don’t give you much information, but I want you to focus on the bet sizing, what it tells you, what it doesn’t tell you, and how you would normally react under these conditions. Go with the flow, people.

Until next time, make mine poker!

Because I don’t feel like writing about my $391 loss last night at the Wall Street cash game (I would’ve lost $400, if not for the fact that I paid for my philly cheese steak with chips…SANDWICH FREEROLL!), I wanted to look at another hand from Brian Townsend (“BT”). Please feel free to continue commenting on my last post. For the most part, a lot of people wrote off the situation as a cooler. I understand that totally, but I wanted to go a bit deeper and ask if there was some better overall strategy to that particular hand. It’s definitely Monday Morning Quartbacking, but it makes for a good lesson in hand analysis. In the end, even if he followed my strategy (calling the turn raise instead of raising), BT would’ve ended up all-in by the river, so the results would be the same (cooler!), but I still maintain that his play would’ve been better had he simply called the raise on the turn.

Alas, in the comments, DP aka Fluxer left me a link to another BT hand, HERE.

In this hand, BT is playing $300/600 HU NLHE against Bawank (“Wank”). BT has about $87k to Wank’s $187k. BT is dealt A9o in the BB (in postiion preflop, out of position postflop). Wank raises to $1,200, and BT raises to $5,200. Wank calls.

The flop is 348, with two hearts. BT has no hearts. He bets out $8,200 into the $10,400 pot. Wank calls.

The turn is an offsuit 9, giving BT top pair, top kicker. BT waits until after the 15 second warning and bets $21,000. Wank raises to about $46,000 total. BT pushes all-in for about $74,000 total. Wank calls and shows 44. The river is a 5h, and BT loses a bucket load of cash.

Fluxer seemed to think that BT played this hand much worse than the last one. I, however, think he may have played this hand better (although not optimal). Preflop, I think it is definitely correct to raise with A9 HU. The raise of $4k on top of Wank’s min-raise will hopefully elicit information. If Wank re-raises, BT has to slow down and potentially drop the hand. However, if BT just flat calls, he won’t have sufficient info on how to act post-flop.

When the flop misses BT, he puts out a decent continuation bet/bluff. I have no problem with this move either. He was out of position, so if he checked, Wank could bet with any two cards and BT would most likely have to fold. By betting out, BT is able to potentially force a fold on superior hands that missed the flop (AT, mostly), avoid lesser hands from getting a free card and beating him (KJ and the like), and get a better idea of what Wank has depending on his response. Wank flat calls, which we now know means that he flopped a monster, but at the time, it could easily appear to be a flush draw calling or a weak under pair.

On the turn, BT is screwed by his seeming luck. Personally, I love bluffing that flop and turning a random card that can easily put me in the lead. That is likely what BT thought happened here. So, he bet out after waiting a while. I’m not sure if the delay was due to distractions/multi-tabling, or if it was a strategy to look weak, but it looks like Wank took the bait when he raises. Once again, BT re-raises himself all-in, and once again he was wrong…and once again, this is where I’ll admonish him. Call, damnit! I know some people think you should never call in NLHE. Raise or fold. But sometimes, you have to call when you cannot quantify the range of possibilities. Clearly, Wank could be behind with two hearts (drawing) or a flopped underpair to the 9s. If that’s the case, I don’t see the point of trying to scare him off by raising all-in. On the flipside, if BT thought he’d be called by these lesser hands, why not wait to see the river to try to induce the further action then, especially if the other guy is drawing thin.

There is a fair argument that you want to get drawing players to commit their chips BEFORE they miss their draw. It’s a valid and intelligent point. However, in this instance, I think the re-raise from Wank also implies the possibility that BT was behind. This makes the turn re-raise push even more baffling.

In both hands, BT just seems to want to get his chips in the middle as quick as possible. This, to me, is the central flaw in both situations. I think the correct move for BT was to call the turn raise and check-call. If he was ahead, then he’d likely get paid off on the river anyway, because Wank is going to bluff or whatnot when he is checked to, but if he is behind, that last heart could’ve saved him some money. It wouldn’t have here, but if he was behind to two pair, the extra heart may have induced a check from Wank.

Any more opinions? To me, this one is less concrete than the last one. I wonder if players think he shouldn’t have considered slowing down with TPTK? I still don’t think he should’ve folded, but I’m not 100% convinced that calling would be right either. Thoughts?

Lately, I feel like I have so much to write about, but when I open the Blogger screen, it all just goes blank. It’s probably the lack of live poker, and the irregular smattering of online poker I’ve been playing. In the meanwhile, I am sloooooooooowly reading (or actually, have gone back to reading) “The Psychology of Poker” by Alan Schoonmaker. Its an interesting take on the poker book, and I’m simultaneously having fun and scaring myself by reading the chapter on Loose Aggressive players, the group with which I most readily identify. I’ve been tabbing pages like mad, but I’m not ready to discuss it here yet.

In the meanwhile, I continue to read a slew of poker blogs. One of the newest ones on my roster is written by none other than Brian Townsend, the online poker pro who went from penny stakes to the live Big Game within a few years. One poker player once said that the common thread amongst all pros is that at the beginning of their careers, they were disproportionately lucky. Its that easy instant win or success that can lure some players into a life that they expect to be all roses. But reality sets in and often, the life isn’t quite what the would-be pro expected.

In Townsend’s case, he went from quarter games to quarter-million swings in a few years. I first heard about him in detail from listening to the PokerWire podcasts. His success blew my mind, particularly because he was rumored to be slaughtering the Big Game during the WSOP. I’m not quite sure how that ended up, but within the last month, his blog has read like a trainwreck, as he suffers though a period of losses that all experienced players experience at one point in their careers. Still, when I read Brian’s recent post and checked out the hand history that so baffled him, I saw a player that was clearly lost (in that one particular hand and in his inability to understand what went wrong ONLY).

You can see the hand HERE, but I will also provide a narrative:

Brian (“BT”) is playing $50/100 HU NLHE with LarsLuzak (“LL”). Both players have stacks of about $11,000. BT has 37h in the SB. He’ll be acting first preflop, but last for the rest of the hand. He starts off by raising to $300. LL calls.

The flop is J66, with two hearts, giving BT a baby flush draw. LL checks, BT bets $500 (just under a pot-sized bet), and LT calls.

The turn is a 2h, giving BT a flush. LL checks, BT bets $1400 (just under a pot-sized bet), and LL raises to $4444 (about $3k on top). BT raises all-in for another $6k or so more. LL calls and shows 22 for a turned full house. The river is moot, because BT is drawing dead.

According to BT in his recent post, “Also today I got action at 50/100 for the first time from LarsLuzak. He dropped down to play me and beat me for 11K. This loss really bothered me as he has really been holding it over me of late. Usually when I analyze my play after a session I can come to a conclusion the hands I played. This was not the case today as I still don’t know how I feel about this hand and its really begining to bother me. I think I will look at it tomorrow and run through some more calculations.”

In my estimation, BT’s problem was that he was tilting, plain and simple. You may be thinking, but Jordan, it was a Cooler! He turned a flush and it just happened to be the perfect card to also fill the full house! He lost to a two-freakin’-outter. And you may be right, but that’s not what the hand and BT’s comment tells me. Let’s go through the hand together, and look at BT’s comments to shed some light on the subject.

First off, according to BT, he only lost $11k to LL, so this is the hand where it all went down. Presumably, before this they were relatively even. However, as BT explains it “This loss really bothered me as he has really been holding it over me of late.” So, immediately we know that, even though they were about even at the beginning of the hand, BT feels that LL has been beating him lately, so they have history. We also know that BT gets bothered by such losses. Its common enough. When we are used to succeeding and then we are hit by unexpected losses, it can affect one’s psychology. Let’s assume, then, that BT was playing, psychologically, from a position of wanting to beat LL in order to change the fact that LL was beating him lately.

We can also assume (although it is a more tenuous assumption) that LL knows he’s been beating BT. After all, he was willing to drop in stakes to play BT, and BT admits that LL has his number.

So, we’ve set the psychological framework of both players. BT is trying to prove something and LL is on a roll.

Now let’s look at the action. A preflop raise with low gap connectors may look suspect to some of you, but I have no problem with it. We don’t know how loose or tight the action was, so I’m giving BT a pass on this raise. In fact, given his position, I kinda like it.

The flop looks nice. He has a flush draw that’s likely pretty hidden. LL checks, so BT might as well bet the draw. LL will probably fold, after all, and BT can take down the $600 without even hitting his draw. Still, LL calls, so BT has to be aware that LL has something, even if it is as little as Ace-high. The one exception is if LL has been floating a lot and raising big on the turn, but we have no information as to his floating proclivity, so let’s ignore that for the time being.

On the turn, BT has to be happy. He made his flush, and since he bet the flop, it isn’t obvious that he was on that draw. So, his bet of $1400 is actually pretty good. Separately, I’d like to write about the psychology of sizing bets just below pot, but that’s a broader subject for later this week.

But after his bet, LL raises $3k on top. At this point, it is crucial for BT to slow down and analyze the hand. I don’t know if he did or not, but if he did, these are the things he has to consider: (1) LL just called the flush draw flop which may indicate that he was drawing to a better flush, (2) the board is paired so LL may have a full house and was waiting for the flush or four-card flush draw to hit before trying to get paid off big, (3) the board has three hearts, so LL may be on a four-card flush draw that would beat BT if it hits, (4) LL may have three-of-a-kind 6s, paired his Jack, or has a pocket-pair ONLY.

If you look at these possibilities, you realize that a great number of them result in BT being 100% screwed. This includes losing to the higher flush or the full house. There are also a couple of possibilities where he is ahead, but could be drawn out on. For the most part, the chance of being drawn out on is relatively low (15% if LL has an 8h or higher, about 9% if he has a Jack or pocket pair, and about 22% if he has a 6).

Still, when you weigh the possibilities and the action, I would assume that LL is more likely to make this play when he has the fullhouse or higher flush than to raise like this if he has one of the dominated hands discussed. Of course, LL may have been floating a lot or may have been uber aggressive throughout the game, so for the sake of kindness, let’s assume that its a 50/50 chance that LL has BT beat or that LL is behind.

What does BT do? He re-raises all-in! This is the wrong move. Why? The pot is now $7,444 when BT decides to reraise $6000 on top. This may be called by one of those drawing hands, but it will DEFINITELY be called by the flush or full house. Assuming BT knew that he was behind, this would obviously be a terrible raise. But is it a good raise if BT was ahead? I think not.

When BT is ahead, he has at least a 78% chance of taking down the pot. I would argue that the better move would be to call here, and wait for the river card before making your ultimate determination. There is not enough information to discern whether LL is making a move or has the goods, and LL’s play can be read either way (although I still think the timing and size of the check-raise indicates clear strength). By calling and seeing the river, BT will find out if one of the scare cards comes out (Jack, 6, or a heart, fourteen cards total), and he will see how LL reacts. LL might have three of a kind and slow down at the sight of another heart, or a Jack or Six may come down and LL slow downs again because his 22 fullhouse looks no good. In either instance, BT might be able to bluff off LL (depending on his holdings, which we now realize is 22, and therefore unlikely), or BT can just check behind LL in these situations and effectively save $6k.

In other situations, that fourth Heart or 6 will fall and it will scare off BT. Even so, BT was behind anyway (as we now know) so the fourth heart or 6 would HELP him by forcing BT’s fold.
In actuality, the river was an offsuit 9, and most likely LL would’ve pushed and BT would’ve called. The results would have been effectively the same, but the possible results are very different.

If there is anything to learn about this situation, it is that not all things are as cooler-ish as they look, and that there is always opportunity to analyze a hand to look at different possibilities, regardless of outcome, to determine what the best play was. It also shows something about mentality at the table. BT admitted that he felt that he was getting schooled by LL in general, and in this hand, BT wanted to prove himself through aggression. There is no reason to re-raise the turn, but BT did it anyway, probably by overestimated the likelihood that LL would do this with crap cards. In fact, this is a common problem that I write about a lot. Its very easy to get frustrated with an uber-aggressive or uber-lucky opponent, but that does not excuse you from addressing each hand individually to look for signs that LL actually has a hand. To me, it looked like BT thought, “I have this sweet hidden flush, so I raise…wait, he raises me back? But I have the FLUSH! I raise all-in!”

Some of you might know more about BT through his blog, other news sources or his appearances on High Stakes Poker on GSN. Maybe you can offer some insight into his play in general. This is not a critique of BT or his play. This is one individual hand and my analysis, given the words of BT.

Would you view this hand differently? Do I make sense? I would love some feedback, because I do think that the hand shows the benefits of checking with a made hand in certain situations and the need to consider the wide range of your opponents’ possible holdings AND the probable outcomes of each of those holdings.

Until next time, make mine poker!